Transition 2000: George W. Bush

While president-elect George W. Bush’s transition was delayed almost a month because of the uncertainty of the election outcome, historian John P. Burke rates his transition as probably one of the most effective in modern times.  This was not only because of effective prior planning by the president-elect and the relative absence of infighting among the president-elect’s transition and campaign staffs, but also the supporting materials developed and contributed by many think tanks.  In fact Roy Neel, the head of Al Gore’s nascent transition effort, called it “breathtakingly successful.”

 Pre-Election 

Bush started his presidential transition planning efforts in 1999 when he asked his long-time friend, Clay Johnson, III, to start thinking about it.  Johnson at the time was Texas Governor Bush’s chief of staff.  Johnson immersed himself in the literature about past transitions and contacted a range of advisors from the Reagan and elder Bush’s Administrations.  He talked with them about how to set up a White House, what characteristics to look for when selecting candidates for different cabinet posts, and how to manage inter-relationships between different departments. He also talked with former leaders of past transitions about details such as understanding the FBI clearance process.

By June 2000, Johnson had developed a list of tasks and priorities for managing the transition.  Once Richard Cheney was selected to be Bush’s vice presidential candidate, Johnson sat down with him and honed the list based on Cheney’s prior White House experience.  Johnson had developed a list of about 200 names for potential cabinet posts before Election Day and in mid-October Andrew Card was quietly asked to be the White House chief of staff.  Johnson knew from the history of past transitions that putting a White House staff in place early was a key to success.

 Post-Election 

When the election results were delayed, the transition efforts slowed down.  On November 27^th, after the Florida secretary of state certified Bush as the winner, the Bush presidential transition effort became more public.  But because the election results were not official, the Bush transition effort was not eligible to receive public funding from the General Services Administration.  Bush funded his initial transition effort with private funds, with a paid staff of 15 supplemented with about 50 volunteers.  On December 14, after Vice President Al Gore conceded the election, the transition efforts were ramped up.  Cheney was formally named the transition chairman and Johnson became the transition executive director.

By then, the Bush transition team had already identified all the key White House staff positions.  Within three weeks, Bush announced his entire cabinet.  Afterwards, the selection of sub-cabinet positions was done jointly between the White House Office of Personnel and the cabinet secretaries.

In terms of policy planning, the transition team built off of the policy position briefing papers prepared during the campaign; many of those who contributed to the policy papers became players on the new White House staff.  The transition effort decided to focus on five policy proposals in the first months of the Administration, including tax cuts and education reform.   This targeted agenda kept the early White House staff focused.

After the Inauguration, the White House staff was reputed to be well-focused.  However the Brookings Institution’s Presidential Appointee Initiative found that filling key appointee positions in agencies was slower than in past Administrations.  Of the 485 positions that the Initiative was tracking, only 29 appointees had been confirmed at the 100-day point of the new Administration, and by the end of August 2001, only 227 had been confirmed and 144 of the other positions still had no one even nominated to fill them.  Brookings found that it took an average of 8.7 months to move an appointee through the Senate confirmation process.

On the other hand, the availability of training funds set aside by law to orient new political appointees was seen as contributing to a more cohesive team.  Johnson said the training was used to create the sense of a unified team, to acquaint them with the President’s goals, values, and expectations; and to provide them with the tools and hindsight of previous Administrations to shorten learning curves.

*** This story was abstracted from John P. Burke’s book, “Becoming President:  The Bush Transitions, 2000-2003”  If you were involved in this transition, please feel free to add your stories, as well! ***

Transition 1992: Bill Clinton

Planning efforts for Bill Clinton’s presidential transition started early, but most observers felt it went awry almost immediately and that this impeded his ability to effectively act on his agenda once in office.  It took almost six months after the Inauguration for things to come together.  Historian John Burke concluded: “. . . the transition lacked a certain organizational and managerial competence.”

 Pre-Election 

After the July 1988 Democratic convention, Bill Clinton asked his campaign chairman, Mickey Kantor, to head up a small pre-transition planning operation.  Kantor set up a small office of 10-15 staff in Little Rock, not far from the election campaign headquarters.  The group’s work was overseen by a five-member Pre-Transition Planning Foundation, comprised of senior advisors such as Warren Christopher and Vernon Jordan.  The group was told to not focus on personnel issues but rather on budget, economic, foreign, and national security policy issues.  They also met with the General Services Administration transition support staff and developed an ethics code of conduct for the transition team. 

However, Kantor was not part of candidate Clinton’s inner circle involved in his storied campaign “war room.”  Much like Jimmy Carter’s Jack Watson, there were pre-transition conflicts between the pre-transition and campaign staffs and Kantor was seen as going out of his way to alienate people.

 Post-Election 

The day after the election, Kantor presented president-elect Clinton with a thick transition briefing book and recommended himself to be the transition director.  Clinton deferred any decision and in the interim, rivalries quickly blossomed.  Clinton ultimately selected Jordon to chair the effort and Christopher to be the transition director, with headquarters in Little Rock.  A week later, Clinton named a 48-member transition leadership team.

Clinton then turned his focus to selecting his cabinet, which he wanted to be diverse, talented, and able to work together as a team.  He also continued his job as governor. Observers noted that no real planning was undertaken in Little Rock around the organization of the White House or its staff.  Clinton was reported to believe that the White House staff would come together and fall in place on its own.

Three transition policy teams were formed:  domestic, national security, and economic.  Cabinet selections paralleled these teams, with appointments for economic-related issues being announced first followed by the foreign policy team.  In December, president-elect Clinton chaired an economic summit of 400 business leaders, economists, and union leaders on potential directions for economic policy.  Observers felt that the transition team was simultaneously focusing on too many policy fronts, developing laundry lists and briefing books but no specific action plans.   Clinton was seen as being attentive to policy development but lacked focus on developing a process to turn them into action.  There were some exceptions.  For example, Al From, who directed the domestic policy team, put together action plans for specific initiatives such as national community service. 

Clinton announced his chief of staff in mid-December.  Once announced, Mack McLarty, a childhood friend of Bill Clinton, began to focus on developing a White House structure, such as the creation of the National Economic Council.  But many staffers were not hired until the week before Inauguration and they could not get the necessary FBI clearances to begin debriefing departing Bush Administration officials about their jobs.  In addition, the campaign had promised a 25 percent cut in White House staff and there was a debate as to what that constituted.  So there were discussions about reorganizing the White House and spinning off offices such as the Office of the Trade Representative and the Office of National Drug Control Policy.  These debates further delayed the staffing of the White House.

The transition further stalled when key officials – transition team chairman Warren Christopher and transition personnel director Ed Riley – were tapped for cabinet positions (State and Education).  As a consequence, they largely disengaged from their transition jobs to begin preparation for their confirmation and staffing of their respective departments.  The transition team devolved into confusion until Inauguration Day.  The disarray carried over to the new White House staff where an overburdened policy agenda began to collide with an understaffed organization, allowing many opportunities for action to slip away in the early months of the Administration.

*** This story was abstracted from John P. Burke’s book, “Presidential Transitions:  From Politics to Practice.”   If you were involved in this transition, please feel free to add your stories, as well! ***

Transition 1988: George H.W. Bush

The Reagan to Bush transition has been characterized as a “friendly takeover.” This may have been true at the very top levels, but people I knew who were “on the ground level” in agencies saw it as being more difficult than a changeover between political parties.

Pre-Election

Transition planning began almost a year in advance; Chase Untermeyer raised the topic during a Christmas party at the Bush residence and was subsequently asked to explore what needed to be done. No work was begun until April 1988 after the primaries left Bush as the clear candidate. Untermeyer’s work was limited: he was told not to address personnel or policy issues, or White House organizational issues. He was to focus on the stand-up of the transition headquarters and lay out the structure for making personnel and policy decisions during the transition period.

In parallel, President Reagan’s staff undertook efforts for an orderly transition. The director of Presidential Personnel met with Untermeyer on the organization and operation of the Office of Presidential Personnel, going through each department, job-by-job. President Reagan’s chief of staff developed a checklist for the incoming transition team, as well.

Post-Election

President-elect Bush unveiled his key transition team the day after the election. He appointed Craig Fuller (his vice presidential chief of staff) and Robert Teeter (a key campaign strategist) as co-directors, with Untermeyer and C. Boyden Gray as deputies. Untermeyer headed the personnel function and Gray served as legal counsel.

Untermeyer recommended a small transition staff of about 100, but it ultimately grew to about 225 (GSA had prepared office space for 500!). Untermeyer was asked to provide 3-5 names for each cabinet position and 50 state recruiters were encouraged to come up with “fresh faces.”

Because there were no large agency teams, President Reagan’s chief of staff sent out a memo to agency political appointees to provide requested briefing book information. Binders were prepared for incoming cabinet appointees with information about their jobs and advice on proper behavior during the transition period.

Sub-cabinet positions were filled later; the selections were made jointly between the incoming secretary and the White House Office of Presidential Personnel, with the White House office suggesting potential appointees. Lower-level appointments were more highly controlled by Presidential Personnel.

President-elect Bush asked John Sunnunu to be his chief of staff 9 days after the election. Bush had wanted a strong chief of staff, but there was tension among his close associates immediately after the election about who should fill the position. According to media reports, both Fuller and Teeter were opposed to Sunnunu’s selection and chose to not join the new Administration. Instead, they both left after the transition.

In the end, according to historian John Burke, “The president-elect had assembled a cabinet and staff populated with longtime friends, most with a high degree of prior governmental experience.”

*** This story was abstracted from John P. Burke’s book, “Presidential Transitions: From Politics to Practice.” If you were involved in this transition, please feel free to add your stories, as well! ***

Transition 1980: Ronald Reagan

Ronald Reagan’s transition has been characterized as one of the most effective in modern history.  It was well-planned, internal staff friction was limited, and a clear policy agenda led to quick wins in the first year of his Administration.

 Pre-Election 

Reagan’s pre-election transition effort was limited to personnel planning.  Unlike the Carter effort, there was no emphasis on policy-making, agenda-setting, or organization of the White House.  Pendelton James, a former Nixon White House personnel office staffer and professional headhunter, led the early efforts.  He reported to Ed Meese who was the chief of staff for Reagan’s presidential campaign.  They met frequently and decided that, based on the campaign’s focus on economic issues, James’ priority would bet to identify candidates for the 87 key positions across the government responsible for economic policy.  After the election, he developed a database with more than 30,000 names.

Parallel to James’ operation, the campaign created a series of expert working groups and task forces around defense and domestic/economic issues.  There were 25 defense working groups under Richard Allen and 23 domestic/economic task forces under Martin Anderson – totaling about 500 members.  While these provided insight into campaign issues, they also provided a foundation for the post-election transition effort.

 Post-Election 

The transition team was led by Bill Casey and Anne Armstrong, who co-chaired the campaign.  Meese was appointed the transition director, with Jim Baker (the designated White House chief of staff) as his deputy.  Baker focused on organizing the White House.  There were 1,200 people – about half of them paid – who participated in about 48 task forces examining agencies, policy, personnel, legislative agendas, and legal issues (40 lawyers volunteered their advice on navigating lobbying and conflict-of-interest rules).

Cabinet selections did not crowd out policy decisions.  The White House staff was developed early and focused on policy.  Cabinet selections were filtered through an informal “kitchen cabinet” of Reagan friends and James.  James ensured tighter White House control over sub-cabinet appointments.

Policy was developed in the context of a broader strategic plan and the White House eventually included an Office of Policy Coordination.  Reagan’s decision-making style leaned towards delegation and group deliberation, so the Cabinet was organized around issue clusters focusing on decisions requiring some consensus before being brought to the President. 

The transition team developed a detailed, day-by-day agenda for the President’s first month in office.  This agenda helped ensure focus on a limited number of policy issues that were at the top of the agenda.

*** This story was abstracted from John P. Burke’s book, “Presidential Transitions:  From Politics to Practice.”   If you were involved in this transition, please feel free to add your stories, as well! ***

Transition 1976: Jimmy Carter

Jimmy Carter’s pre-election transition effort was more ambitious than any of his predecessors in terms of its size and attention to staffing and policy development.  He basically developed the formula that would be used by all of his successors.  However, according to presidential historian John Burke, Carter’s transition “proved deeply flawed in its details and execution; it affected, in turn, his presidency.”

Richard Nixon was the first president-elect to receive public funding for his post-election transition effort.  However, President Lyndon Johnson split the funding in order to support his departure from office, leaving Nixon with $375,000 to support his transition effort.  Carter’s post-election transition effort was the first to receive designated federal funding, in the amount of $2 million. 

 Pre-Election 

Carter was the first presidential candidate to start a pre-election transition effort so early, once he got the nomination locked up but before the primary season was over.  He designated Jack Watson, who lead Governor Carter’s state government reorganization efforts, to lead the pre-election transition effort in early June.  Carter specified that this effort would be separate from the campaign because he did not want to distract the campaign staff.

After the Democratic convention, the pre-transition effort was expanded and staffed with people experienced with the federal government.  It was allocated a budget of $150,000 and obtained assistance from a management consulting firm.  It developed lists of potential appointees and issues, option papers, and a potential legislative agenda.  The existence of this group aggravated the campaign manager, Hamilton Jordan.  The campaign staff was concerned that the separate pre-election transition staff was developing options that did not reflect campaign commitments.  They also felt the transition team was overly conventional, cautious, late-comers, elitists, who represented the Washington establishment.  This led to squabbling and friction.

 Post-Election 

President-elect Carter chose to stay in Plains, Georgia during the transition.  Watson sent him briefing books, option papers, and lists of potential appointees.  He also developed a white paper on the role of the transition staff and transition coordinator.  Jordan and Watson met with Carter to work out their differences, but Carter did not resolve them.  He told them to work it out among themselves.  There was no clear line of command and Carter had to continually intervene to resolve conflicts.  By that time, there were over 200 staff on the payroll and nearly 80 others as volunteers.

Carter wanted to have a Cabinet-run, rather than a White House staff-run, government.  As governor, he convened his cabinet frequently as a deliberative body and he wanted to replicate that in the White House instead of relying on a small cadre of White House staff, as President Nixon did.  As a consequence, he occupied himself in the weeks after the election with selecting the Cabinet.  In addition, he indirectly delegated the selection of sub-cabinet officials to the cabinet officers.  He did not focus on the selection and organization of the White House staff until a week before the Inauguration.  Roles of White House staffers were not defined; they evolved over the succeeding months.

In parallel, without a strong decision-making process in place, the number of policy initiatives to be pursued in the early months of the Administration grew.  There was no process to manage them.

Taken together, these various mishaps framed the Administration with a sense of disorganization and micro-management by the President that persisted throughout his Administration.

*** This story was abstracted from John P. Burke’s book, “Presidential Transitions:  From Politics to Practice.”   If you were involved in this transition, please feel free to add your stories, as well! ***