Transition Lessons: Pre- and Post-Election

Scholars have studied presidential transitions over the past 40 years, which I’ve reflected in several earlier blog posts. While it might seem to be an obscure niche of scholarship, their efforts have been vitally important every 4 to 8 years. What have they learned that could be helpful to the upcoming transition?

Dr. Martha Kumar and several of her colleagues collaborated in 2001 on an interesting paper summarizing their years of work up to that point.

First, they note that the institutional presidency matters. However, the absence of any institutional memory in the White House that accompanies a transition means the incoming president needs to rely on veterans of previous White House operations in order to be effective. Think tanks can help provide some insights into the institutional presidency, but people with experience are vital.

Second, they caution that having a good pre-election transition planning effort is not necessarily predictive of an effective post-election effort. They point to several past transitions where the pre-election and post-election transition players were not well-connected with either the candidate or the campaigns and this caused the post-election transition efforts to stumble.

Pre-Election

The literature on past transitions is helpful and offers several lessons:

Build a Bridge.A key pre-election step is to ensure there is trust between the leadership of the campaign staff and the pre-election transition planning group. The most publicized disconnect occurred when president-elect Jimmy Carter’s hand-chosen pre-election transition planner was displaced after the election. The most effective was the George W. Bush transition, where a close friend led the effort both before and after the election.

Watch Commitments. A second important cautionary note raised by academic observers is for the candidate to avoid making commitments that will constrain their ability to govern. The classic example is Bill Clinton’s campaign promise to cut the White House staff by 25 percent and to impose strict ethics pledge on his appointees (which reportedly led many capable people to reject offers to join the Administration, and which was repealed in the waning days of his Administration so leaving officials could find employment).

Draw Up a List. A third lesson was the importance of developing a list of key positions to be filled, and the order in which groups of appointments should be decided upon. There are about 7,800 political positions, of which about half are part-time jobs on boards and commissions. The transition team will receive between 40,000 and 70,000 resumes to fill these jobs. About 1,200 are appointments requiring Senate confirmation (cabinet secretaries, assistant secretaries, judges, ambassadors, district attorneys, US marshals). About 1,400 are Schedule C; 800 non-career Senior Executives; and 800 White House staff. GSA will work with the pre-election transition teams to identify automated software to handle the post-election surge.

While figuring out which jobs to fill first will be important, but equally important is coming up with a selection process that is seen as fair by those rejected. Past experience shows that a process seen as unfair leads to end-runs and a breakdown in the process itself.

Post-Election

What about post-election? Flipping the switch from campaigning to governing means the new president-elect needs to be up and running day after election. He or she will have 77 days to form a White House staff, designate senior cabinet officials, prepare an inaugural address, define an agenda, and begin developing a $3 trillion budget to send to Congress.

About 600 staff can be involved in a transition – some paid, and many volunteers. But this number varies greatly. The Reagan transition involved more than double that number while the George H.W. Bush transition was about half that size. Observers say that about 600 for a transition between parties seem to be a manageable number.

Pick Key White House Staff.Academic observers say a key lesson is that the selection of top White House staff should be the first order. When that did not happen, there was endless jockeying for position and little commitment to substantive action on the president-elect’s policy agenda. If the key goal during the transition is to develop a set of policy initiatives and a decision-making process to be used in the early White House, then the president-elect needs to have key White House staffing decisions out of the way. Focusing on the selection, vetting, confirmation process for the 15 cabinet members is seen as secondary.

Develop Policy Proposal Process. A second lesson is the importance of developing a strategic plan for the policy proposals to be put in place. This means developing a prioritization and decision-making process – and only then focusing on substance. An advantage of having these in place early is that they can also be used as a screen to help hire new appointees and get their buy-in up front on the president-elect’s agenda. The most effective policy teams have a plan for the first 3 weeks, the next 3 months, and the following 6 months.

Decide on Governance Style.A third lesson is making some early institutional decisions on how the president-elect wants to govern. It is easier to make these decisions at the outset rather than having to change course later. These decisions would include questions such as:

• What is the role of the cabinet vs. White House policy councils?
• What should be the role of key staff (e.g., will the chief of staff be an honest broker, a gate keeper, a controller of the information flow, a step in the decision-making process, etc.)?

Learn From the Outgoing Team. A fourth lesson is taking the time to glean lessons from the outgoing team. This is more likely to happen at the top levels, since the mid-level positions in most agencies will not be filled for 6 to 9 months. The outgoing team will have an institutional sense of responsibility, but past experience says the incoming team generally won’t be interested in listening to them (I know; I had first hand experience being ignored). These lessons are all useful and grounded in practice. Dr. Kumar and her colleagues are in the process of updating their research and this will be available this Fall to the incoming transition teams.

If you’ve had experience with a transition, what advice would you add?

National Security During Transition

Last week the Congressional Research Service released a report noting: “A presidential transition is a unique time in America and holds . . . a possible risk to the nation’s security interests.” It cites Frances Townsend, who used to be President Bush’s homeland security advisor, as saying that Al Qaeda targeted terror attacks around the Spanish and British elections in recent years and that it “wants to influence elections and have political influence.”

The report’s author, John Rollins, is a specialist in terrorism and national security. He recommends several activities to facilitate a smooth transition in power in the face of potential threats. These include:

· Involving the national security representatives of presidential hopefuls in all transition-related discussions and holding a table-top exercise after the election so the incoming team can understand and test the national security coordination system;

· Establishing a joint advisory council that draws on the expertise of both the National Security Council and the Homeland Security Council to address transition-related risks;

· Passing the FY2009 appropriations without undue delay,

· Quickly assigning congressional committee members to committees focused on national security, and

· Appointing career civil servants to mid- and high-level positions in national security areas to provide continuity during the transition.

He cited several little-known resources, including a January 2008 presidential transition report prepared by President Bush’s Homeland Security Advisory Council. That report encourages information exchanges and collaborative efforts by the Department of Homeland Security with major party candidates.

Rollins’ report discusses a provision added in the 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act which “allows each major party candidate for President to submit, before the date of the general election, requests for security clearances of prospective transition team members” who would require access to classified information during the transition. This would mean background investigations would be completed by the day after the election. The Act also requires the outgoing Administration to prepare a classified report of specific operational threats pending at the time.

Rollins also notes that outgoing President Bush may want to create a Presidential Transition National Security Coordinating Council to oversee national security-related transition activities. This might include the coordination of training and orientation, and offering lessons learned from past national security activities.

The incoming President-Elect should develop a prioritized list of names to fill key national security leadership positions and Congress should act on them quickly. Rollins notes that at the time of the 9/11 attacks in 2001, less than half of the key positions in the government had been filled.

Rollins noted that the law allows federal career employees to be detailed to the incoming President-Elect’s transition team for national security purposes. He also noted that Congress required the Department of Homeland Security to develop a transition and succession plan (section 2405) to be presented to the incoming Secretary and Undersecretary for Management, and this plan is due December 1, 2008. (A recent media report notes that some members of Congress want to see that plan now).

GSA Role in Transition

“Who’s in charge of a transition?  Nobody.  There’s no government-wide standard on how to do it,” says David Bibb, deputy administrator of the General Services Administration (GSA), and the career senior executive designated to help organize the administrative support for the upcoming presidential transition effort.

 

Bibb, who spoke at a forum held at the National Academy for Public Administration last week, said GSA already has a transition support team identified and it has been meeting quarterly since mid-2004.  They’ve developed a detailed timeline and have identified temporary office space for a transition team of up to 600 people – along with parking, furniture, and support services.  He says their goal is to focus on logistics of the transition and the inauguration so the president-elect’s team can focus on the substance of the transition itself.  He says that up to 40 GSA staff will likely be involved.

 

In addition to supporting the incoming team, GSA will also help support the outgoing team of President George Bush.  In fact, agencies are already designating officials who will be the point persons during the transition for their agencies.  Bibb says GSA has not yet reached out to the presidential candidates to let them know what GSA can and will be able to provide in terms of support.  He thinks that will likely occur after the political conventions are held later this summer.

 

He outlined two items that GSA will be responsible for — in addition to the logistics –that were added by law in 2000:

 

Appointee Directory.  GSA will work with the National Archives, the Office of Personnel Management, and the White House office of presidential personnel to develop a high-level overview of federal departments and agencies for incoming political appointees.  In 2000, that document was both a 50-page guide as well as a website.  GSA is exploring different options for 2008.

 

Orientation of incoming political appointees.  GSA is developing a document that would be shared with the pre-election transition teams presidential candidates will form after the conventions.  This document will outline the requirements of the statutory provision on orientation of incoming political appointees, along with organizations that may have the potential capacity to support the orientations.  GSA will not define the content of the orientation or the approach to the orientation – whether it is training-style or discussion group-style.  That will be up to the president-elect’s transition team.

 

In addition, GSA will consult with both candidates’ teams in advance of the election to coordinate things such as software for the collection of resumes.

 

Why is the GSA role so important to get right?  Political scientists have said that a smooth transition is important to getting the new president’s agenda off on the right foot.  But Bibb says it is now more urgent than that:   after 9/11, “we’ve absolutely got to have the ability to back up” the security-related agencies.  He noted that terrorists attacked at the time of leadership transition ins Spain and the United Kingdom in recent years and we need to be able to respond on Day One.

Lesson on the Powers to Lead

Last week I had an opportunity to listen to an interesting presentation.  Dr. Joseph Nye,  the former dean of the JFK School at Harvard, spoke on his new book, “The Powers to Lead,“ at a breakfast seminar sponsored by the Council for Excellence in Government.  

He said he wrote his book based on a “distillation of the literature” from psychology, organizational theory, and political theory. The insights he shared with the attendees seems particularly relevant to prospective leaders in the next President’s administration.

 

Dr. Nye says “power” is the ability to influence — using threats, carrots, or inspiration.  He describes two types of power – “soft power” and “hard power.”  Using them in combination effectively results in “smart power.”

 

He says soft power has three attributes: 

·         emotional intelligence (understanding yourself and how you are seen by others),

·         a powerful vision of the future (realistic, not delusional!), and

·         the ability to effectively communicate (both verbally and non-verbally).

 

In contrast, hard power has two attributes: 

·         the organizational ability to manage information flows and

·         Machiavellian political skills (which he also called “bullies with a vision” like Admiral Rickover).

 

Dr. Nye says smart power is the ability to know which of these hard-soft attributes to use in which situation.  He observes that effective leadership is context-dependent.  So, having “contextual intelligence” is an important skill.  I couldn’t agree more! 

 

He also noted, in response to an audience question, that a big challenge facing the next group of government leaders will be adjusting government to the new generation entering public life – the Millennial generation.  He observes that, as workers, they expect to be able to work in a peer-to-peer, horizontal environment, not the traditional hierarchical bureaucracy.  And, as citizens, they expect their political leaders and government to work that way as well.  He thinks that this implies the growing importance of developing and using “soft power” skills.

 

Interestingly, this assessment is reflected in another book, by Morley Winograd and Michael Hais, “Millennial Makeover: MySpace, YouTube, and the Future of
American Politics,” which offers a similar thesis about how the next President will face a very different set of management challenges and public expectations about how government should work.

 

So what will this mean for those working for the new Administration?  Well, like past White Houses, the staff will tend to be quite young, right from the campaign.  Which means Millennials.  And they will bring a new style of work and expectations to government.  Government leaders will need to be able to adjust quicker, collaborate more readily, and adopt technologies that – while common in the private sector – will be new to many in government. This will take “smart power!”

Think Tanks and Other Players - Transition 2008 (Part II)

This blog continues the inventory started last week of what different groups are doing in preparation for the Presidential Transition and the next Administration. . . . I’ll provide updates periodically.

 

Think Tank Players (continued)

 

Brookings Institution.  Brookings provided an update.  In addition to the Patterson revision of his White House Staff book, it says it will sponsor several other book endeavors: “The Presidential Appointee’s Handbook,” by Ed DeSeve; “What Do We Do Now? A Handbook for the President-Elect,” by Stephan Hess, “”Difficult Transition:  Foreign Policy Troubles at the Outset of Presidential Power,” by Kurt Campbell and James Steinberg, and “Restoring the Balance:  A Middle East Strategy for the Next President,” by Martin Indyk and Gary Samore.

 

Center for American Progress.  The Center plans to draft legislative language and related support material for a federal version of Baltimore’s acclaimed “Citi-Stat” performance management process.  It has sponsored research on “data-driven government” systems to support this effort.

 

Mercatus Center, at George Mason University, plans to develop a primer on how an incoming President should deal with “midnight regulations” prepared by the outgoing Administration.  It is also conducting research on improvement for the Program Assessment Review Tool which is being used to assess program performance by the Office of Management and Budget.

 

Academic Players

 

Fels Institute of Government, at the University of Pennsylvania, is sponsoring a website that keeps track of the government management-related campaign statements made by the various candidates.

The White House Transition Project  is being continued in 2008.  Begun as part of the 2000 presidential transition in conjunction with the National Archives and other groups, the Project is directed by Dr. Martha Kumar.  The Project is conducting a series of interviews of key White House officials about the lessons they learned in their roles and advice they have for their successors.  She and her colleagues are also planning to summarize these oral histories in articles and books. 

 

Midge Smith Center for Evaluation Effectiveness, a part of the Trachtenberg School for Public Policy and Public Administration at George Washington University, is conducting research on the OMB Program Assessment Review Tool with the goal of providing guidance for a new process.

 

Other Players

 

Senior Executives Association.  SEA is crafting a report with recommendations to the incoming Administration on managing and improving the senior executive service.  It is also sponsoring a conference on June 10^th for its members on “Shifting Gears,” to prepare them for the transition.

 

Coalition for Effective Change.  CEC is developing an ethics guide for incoming political appointees to help them navigate through existing laws and regulations.  It also co-sponsored the human capital forum held March 12^th, with the Partnership for Public Service.

 

Performance Institute.  The Institute is hosting the Government Performance Coalition website and is sponsoring a series of events.  It sponsored the Government Performance Summit in February and plans to sponsor a series of breakfast dialogue session on human capital, performance, and other management issues.

 

Deloitte Public Sector Research.  Deloitte Research is conducting a survey of government executives on management challenges facing public executives, based on GAO’s report on 21^st century challenges.  It plans to conduct a series of dialogue events to discuss a series of GAO’s policy challenges, such as in education, infrastructure, and healthcare.  In response to the GAO report’s call to fundamentally rethink the federal government’s base of spending and tax programs, it is working jointly with the LBJ School of Public Affairs to develop a “redesign framework” to facilitate the review of the roles and functions of government.   In addition, Deloitte Research is developing two books that it envisions will be helpful to the next Administration, one on innovation strategies and another on the challenges of policy and program execution.

 

Cisco.  Cisco is planning an initiative to develop insights on what the elements of the presidential management agenda should be for the next President.

 

CNA Corporation.  CNA is developing an initiative it is calling “performance-driven government.”

 

Again, if you’ve got additions or revisions, the blog lines are open!

Think Tanks and Other Players: 2008 (Part I)

This is a start of an inventory of who is doing what in terms of developing management advice and support to the incoming President. Since a mix of efforts undertaken by various think tanks and other groups in 2000 helped create a useful bridge in that transition, hopefully similar efforts are underway in 2008. This initial inventory should give you some sense of who is doing what, where the holes are, and where there are opportunities for collaboration.

We’ve divided the various players into four groups: think tanks, government, academics, and other groups. We’re open to other ways of organizing this and, of course, any updates, corrections, or additions. The intended focus of this inventory is on groups supporting government management and the transition – not those groups focusing exclusively on policy issues (that list would be far too long!). There’s at some point a gray area, but this is the general rule of thumb imposed went creating this list. Also, there are oftentimes ongoing collaborative efforts among these different groups and we may not have gotten all these efforts properly described.

Think Tank Players

Government Performance Coalition. The Coalition is comprised of a range of good government groups. It has been sponsoring a website on transition issues since March 2007. It is also coordinating a series of seminars on key management issues, such as the February 2008 Government Performance Summit, sponsored by the Performance Institute, and the March 2008 Human Capital Forum, hosted by the Partnership for Public Service. It aspires to develop a set of recommended actions for the next Administration based on these efforts.

IBM Center for The Business of Government. The Center sponsors this blog and recently posted a set of issue briefs on selected issues. It plans to develop a set of management resources and a guide for new appointees. It is also sponsoring a series of collaborative seminars that could result in recommendations to the next Administration on selected topics, such as improving contracting.

Council for Excellence in Government. CEG plans to continue its famous “Prune Book” but make it an on-line version this time. It is also providing pre-transition assistance to the Department of Homeland Security since, as a new department, it has never experienced a presidential transition before. It is also partnering with other groups on related projects.

National Academy for Public Administration. NAPA is also assisting Homeland Security by inventorying the Department’s executive staff positions. A group of Academy Fellows is drafting a series of papers on key management capacity challenges facing the next Administration as well. The Academy is also collaborating with other groups on related projects.

Partnership for Public Service. The Partnership has already co-sponsored a forum on human capital issues facing the next Administration, with CNA Corporation, the Coalition for Effective Change, and others, and plans to summarize insights that came out of that forum. It also plans to gather lessons learned from previous government reform efforts and offer recommendations to the new Administration.

American Society for Public Administration. The Society does not have a specific project but its professional journal, Public Administration Review, plans to publish a series of articles related to presidential transition over the coming year. It is also running a column with questions and answers on government reform with the presidential candidates. It is also coordinating a coalition of good government groups to develop a letter to candidates to encourage access to government by young people interested in public service.

Association of Government Accountants. AGA plans to co-sponsor a forum with NAPA on the role of chief financial officers in the next Administration and the human capital challenges in the federal financial community. Together they may offer recommendations or insights to the incoming Administration.

Center for the Study of the Presidency. The Center is sponsoring several efforts related to the transition. One, which is more strategy-oriented, is “Agenda 2008: A Nation at Risk,” which defines organizational challenges facing the next President. The more specific effort is its sponsorship of the Project on National Security Reform, which is devoted to rethinking the National Security Act of 1947 which created the Defense Department.

Heritage Foundation. Heritage has just published a new book, “Keys to a Successful Presidency,” which offers insights to a new President.

Brookings Institution. Brookings is sponsoring an update to Brad Patterson’s book, “The White House Staff.” It may also sponsor and work collaboratively with others on related transition issues. It’s emphasis at this point is more policy-oriented via its Opportunity ’08 initiative.

American Enterprise Institute. AEI plans to gather lessons learned from past government reform efforts and reenergize its effort to streamline the presidential nomination and Senate confirmation process, in conjunction with the Brookings Institution.

Reason Public Policy Institute. Reason plans to host a forum this summer of top experts to craft a set of recommendations on how the next President can use competitive sourcing approaches. It also plans to focus research on transportation funding issues the next Administration will be facing when the transportation bill comes up for reauthorization.

Government Players

General Services Administration. GSA serves as the administrative arm for the President-Elect’s Transition Team by providing office space and equipment. It also is required by a 2000 law to develop a transition directory, which was a website in 2000. The same law makes GSA responsible for delivering orientation training for new political appointees.

National Archives and Records Administration. NARA is responsible for the out-going President’s records and it is responsible, by law, for assisting GSA in developing a transition directory.

Office of Personnel Management. OPM is responsible for cataloging all the political appointee positions, which are published as the “Plum Book” by congressional committees. In 2000, it also published a guide for executives on personnel rules associated with the transition.

Government Accountability Office. Since 1988, GAO has developed both a list of High Risk Areas and transition reports that assess key cross-cutting management issues and agency-specific issues. For 2008, GAO will likely continue its High Risk list and reprise its “21^st Century Challenges” report, but may not publish a separate series of transition reports. It will likely provide a series of short issue briefs to the incoming transition team, Congress, and appointees based on what it has found in its reviews over the years and its advice on improvements the new Administration may want to undertaken.

House and Senate government oversight committees. These committees publish the Plum Book and historically the House committee develops a report on the state of management in the federal government based on reviews of GAO and inspector general reports.

* * * *

Since this is getting to be a bit long, I’ll continue the inventory in my next blog entry with the academic and other groups. Meanwhile, your additions and revisions are welcome!

Transition: Role of Think Tanks in 2000

Here’s where this becomes a true blog.  I know only part of the story and hope that you can add what you know to what happened, or correct what I remember! . . . . the full story is more complex than what I know without doing a lot more research, so this is a work-in-progress. . . .

The role of think tanks during a presidential transition period has grown in value over the past 30 years.  The first big public splash of a think tank was the Heritage Foundation’s “Mandate for Leadership” which was prepared in anticipation of the 1980 election of Ronald Reagan.  It was seen as influencing the agenda of the early Reagan Administration.  By 1988, the Government Accountability Office added its voice, issuing a series of transition reports about the policy and management challenges facing the government and specific agencies. 

Also in 1988 the Council for Excellence in Government began publishing what it called “The Prune Book.”  This is a play on the so-called official “Plum Book” which is a quadrennial list of all senior-level policy posts, including all political appointees.  The Prune Book (which they view as experienced plums) focused on job profiles of several dozen of the most difficult sub-cabinet jobs in terms of management challenges.  The Plum Book lists job titles but provides no information about the jobs themselves.  The Prune Book was designed to inform the incoming Administration about key management jobs and the environment and issues the prospective office holder would need to address, in hopes that the new President would pair the rights skills and ability to these crucial jobs.

By the time of the 2000 election, there were a series of think tank efforts devoted to management improvement issues.  I’ll review three of the most prominent that I was aware of.  In addition, The Presidential Transition Act of 2000 resulted in the General Services Administration sponsoring a website that provided basic information about each agency for incoming appointees.   That same Act set aside funds for the incoming Administration to sponsor orientation training for new political appointees.  This training was organized by the Council for Excellence in Government.

The American Enterprise Institute, sponsored a major research effort, “Transition to Governing,” in conjunction with the Brookings Institution.  The effort had several elements.  One focused on around improving the political appointment process, in part by putting forms on-line.  The effort resulted in some fine-tuning of the appointment process – not the major overall envisioned.  The effort also tracked the progress of appointments for the first year of the Bush Administration.

A second element was the White House Interview Program, which also received support from the National Archives and the Pew Charitable Trusts.  This program, led by Dr. Martha Kumar and supported by several dozen academics, was devoted to oral histories and summaries of the historical evolution of key White House posts such as the chief of staff and the director of communications.  The results of these efforts were provided to both pre-election transition teams to help them understand the historical context of the different jobs and how they evolved over time.  This effort is being updated in 2008.

Brookings also sponsored an encyclopedic effort by Brad Patterson, “The White House Staff:  Inside the West Wing and Beyond” which describes what the 5,900 people in 125 different offices do.  It is largely an operators guide to the organization and management of the Executive Office of the President.  This volume is being updated in 2008.

The Council for Excellence in Government developed a 2000 version of its Prune Book.  But it also contributed in several other ways.  It sponsored a forum in mid-2000 among key government, non-profit, and industry officials that focused on the development of an electronic government initiatives for the next Administration.  By creating some consensus, the electronic government agenda got off to a fairly quick start once the Bush Administration took office.  Similarly, Management Concepts, a for-profit training company, sponsored a forum comprised of various stakeholders to develop a civil service reform agenda.  The Council was also asked to organize and lead the Bush transition’s political orientation training for the new Administration, as well.

Other groups also offered management insights and sponsored events.  For example, the Government Performance Coalition, comprised of about two dozen “good government” groups, sponsored a series of seminars on key management capacity issues – performance management, human capital, electronic government, etc.  It summarized its key advice in a short memo and followed it with a short book: “Memos to the President:  Management Advice from the Nation’s Top Public Administrators,” containing a series of essays

The predecessor to the IBM Center, the PWC Endowment for The Business of Government, sponsored a parallel book, “Memos to the President:  Management Advice from the Nation’s Top CEOs.”   The Performance Coalition also did a follow-on report in 2005, entitled: “Getting Results:   A Guide for Federal Leaders and Managers.”

* * * *

Combined, these various efforts contributed to a baseline of information and history that helped the new Administration as it took office.  As the 2008 presidential campaigns develop pre-transition teams, think tanks are beginning to develop their insights for the next President. 

Transition 2000: George W. Bush

While president-elect George W. Bush’s transition was delayed almost a month because of the uncertainty of the election outcome, historian John P. Burke rates his transition as probably one of the most effective in modern times.  This was not only because of effective prior planning by the president-elect and the relative absence of infighting among the president-elect’s transition and campaign staffs, but also the supporting materials developed and contributed by many think tanks.  In fact Roy Neel, the head of Al Gore’s nascent transition effort, called it “breathtakingly successful.”

 Pre-Election 

Bush started his presidential transition planning efforts in 1999 when he asked his long-time friend, Clay Johnson, III, to start thinking about it.  Johnson at the time was Texas Governor Bush’s chief of staff.  Johnson immersed himself in the literature about past transitions and contacted a range of advisors from the Reagan and elder Bush’s Administrations.  He talked with them about how to set up a White House, what characteristics to look for when selecting candidates for different cabinet posts, and how to manage inter-relationships between different departments. He also talked with former leaders of past transitions about details such as understanding the FBI clearance process.

By June 2000, Johnson had developed a list of tasks and priorities for managing the transition.  Once Richard Cheney was selected to be Bush’s vice presidential candidate, Johnson sat down with him and honed the list based on Cheney’s prior White House experience.  Johnson had developed a list of about 200 names for potential cabinet posts before Election Day and in mid-October Andrew Card was quietly asked to be the White House chief of staff.  Johnson knew from the history of past transitions that putting a White House staff in place early was a key to success.

 Post-Election 

When the election results were delayed, the transition efforts slowed down.  On November 27^th, after the Florida secretary of state certified Bush as the winner, the Bush presidential transition effort became more public.  But because the election results were not official, the Bush transition effort was not eligible to receive public funding from the General Services Administration.  Bush funded his initial transition effort with private funds, with a paid staff of 15 supplemented with about 50 volunteers.  On December 14, after Vice President Al Gore conceded the election, the transition efforts were ramped up.  Cheney was formally named the transition chairman and Johnson became the transition executive director.

By then, the Bush transition team had already identified all the key White House staff positions.  Within three weeks, Bush announced his entire cabinet.  Afterwards, the selection of sub-cabinet positions was done jointly between the White House Office of Personnel and the cabinet secretaries.

In terms of policy planning, the transition team built off of the policy position briefing papers prepared during the campaign; many of those who contributed to the policy papers became players on the new White House staff.  The transition effort decided to focus on five policy proposals in the first months of the Administration, including tax cuts and education reform.   This targeted agenda kept the early White House staff focused.

After the Inauguration, the White House staff was reputed to be well-focused.  However the Brookings Institution’s Presidential Appointee Initiative found that filling key appointee positions in agencies was slower than in past Administrations.  Of the 485 positions that the Initiative was tracking, only 29 appointees had been confirmed at the 100-day point of the new Administration, and by the end of August 2001, only 227 had been confirmed and 144 of the other positions still had no one even nominated to fill them.  Brookings found that it took an average of 8.7 months to move an appointee through the Senate confirmation process.

On the other hand, the availability of training funds set aside by law to orient new political appointees was seen as contributing to a more cohesive team.  Johnson said the training was used to create the sense of a unified team, to acquaint them with the President’s goals, values, and expectations; and to provide them with the tools and hindsight of previous Administrations to shorten learning curves.

*** This story was abstracted from John P. Burke’s book, “Becoming President:  The Bush Transitions, 2000-2003”  If you were involved in this transition, please feel free to add your stories, as well! ***

Transition 1992: Bill Clinton

Planning efforts for Bill Clinton’s presidential transition started early, but most observers felt it went awry almost immediately and that this impeded his ability to effectively act on his agenda once in office.  It took almost six months after the Inauguration for things to come together.  Historian John Burke concluded: “. . . the transition lacked a certain organizational and managerial competence.”

 Pre-Election 

After the July 1988 Democratic convention, Bill Clinton asked his campaign chairman, Mickey Kantor, to head up a small pre-transition planning operation.  Kantor set up a small office of 10-15 staff in Little Rock, not far from the election campaign headquarters.  The group’s work was overseen by a five-member Pre-Transition Planning Foundation, comprised of senior advisors such as Warren Christopher and Vernon Jordan.  The group was told to not focus on personnel issues but rather on budget, economic, foreign, and national security policy issues.  They also met with the General Services Administration transition support staff and developed an ethics code of conduct for the transition team. 

However, Kantor was not part of candidate Clinton’s inner circle involved in his storied campaign “war room.”  Much like Jimmy Carter’s Jack Watson, there were pre-transition conflicts between the pre-transition and campaign staffs and Kantor was seen as going out of his way to alienate people.

 Post-Election 

The day after the election, Kantor presented president-elect Clinton with a thick transition briefing book and recommended himself to be the transition director.  Clinton deferred any decision and in the interim, rivalries quickly blossomed.  Clinton ultimately selected Jordon to chair the effort and Christopher to be the transition director, with headquarters in Little Rock.  A week later, Clinton named a 48-member transition leadership team.

Clinton then turned his focus to selecting his cabinet, which he wanted to be diverse, talented, and able to work together as a team.  He also continued his job as governor. Observers noted that no real planning was undertaken in Little Rock around the organization of the White House or its staff.  Clinton was reported to believe that the White House staff would come together and fall in place on its own.

Three transition policy teams were formed:  domestic, national security, and economic.  Cabinet selections paralleled these teams, with appointments for economic-related issues being announced first followed by the foreign policy team.  In December, president-elect Clinton chaired an economic summit of 400 business leaders, economists, and union leaders on potential directions for economic policy.  Observers felt that the transition team was simultaneously focusing on too many policy fronts, developing laundry lists and briefing books but no specific action plans.   Clinton was seen as being attentive to policy development but lacked focus on developing a process to turn them into action.  There were some exceptions.  For example, Al From, who directed the domestic policy team, put together action plans for specific initiatives such as national community service. 

Clinton announced his chief of staff in mid-December.  Once announced, Mack McLarty, a childhood friend of Bill Clinton, began to focus on developing a White House structure, such as the creation of the National Economic Council.  But many staffers were not hired until the week before Inauguration and they could not get the necessary FBI clearances to begin debriefing departing Bush Administration officials about their jobs.  In addition, the campaign had promised a 25 percent cut in White House staff and there was a debate as to what that constituted.  So there were discussions about reorganizing the White House and spinning off offices such as the Office of the Trade Representative and the Office of National Drug Control Policy.  These debates further delayed the staffing of the White House.

The transition further stalled when key officials – transition team chairman Warren Christopher and transition personnel director Ed Riley – were tapped for cabinet positions (State and Education).  As a consequence, they largely disengaged from their transition jobs to begin preparation for their confirmation and staffing of their respective departments.  The transition team devolved into confusion until Inauguration Day.  The disarray carried over to the new White House staff where an overburdened policy agenda began to collide with an understaffed organization, allowing many opportunities for action to slip away in the early months of the Administration.

*** This story was abstracted from John P. Burke’s book, “Presidential Transitions:  From Politics to Practice.”   If you were involved in this transition, please feel free to add your stories, as well! ***

Transition 1988: George H.W. Bush

The Reagan to Bush transition has been characterized as a “friendly takeover.” This may have been true at the very top levels, but people I knew who were “on the ground level” in agencies saw it as being more difficult than a changeover between political parties.

Pre-Election

Transition planning began almost a year in advance; Chase Untermeyer raised the topic during a Christmas party at the Bush residence and was subsequently asked to explore what needed to be done. No work was begun until April 1988 after the primaries left Bush as the clear candidate. Untermeyer’s work was limited: he was told not to address personnel or policy issues, or White House organizational issues. He was to focus on the stand-up of the transition headquarters and lay out the structure for making personnel and policy decisions during the transition period.

In parallel, President Reagan’s staff undertook efforts for an orderly transition. The director of Presidential Personnel met with Untermeyer on the organization and operation of the Office of Presidential Personnel, going through each department, job-by-job. President Reagan’s chief of staff developed a checklist for the incoming transition team, as well.

Post-Election

President-elect Bush unveiled his key transition team the day after the election. He appointed Craig Fuller (his vice presidential chief of staff) and Robert Teeter (a key campaign strategist) as co-directors, with Untermeyer and C. Boyden Gray as deputies. Untermeyer headed the personnel function and Gray served as legal counsel.

Untermeyer recommended a small transition staff of about 100, but it ultimately grew to about 225 (GSA had prepared office space for 500!). Untermeyer was asked to provide 3-5 names for each cabinet position and 50 state recruiters were encouraged to come up with “fresh faces.”

Because there were no large agency teams, President Reagan’s chief of staff sent out a memo to agency political appointees to provide requested briefing book information. Binders were prepared for incoming cabinet appointees with information about their jobs and advice on proper behavior during the transition period.

Sub-cabinet positions were filled later; the selections were made jointly between the incoming secretary and the White House Office of Presidential Personnel, with the White House office suggesting potential appointees. Lower-level appointments were more highly controlled by Presidential Personnel.

President-elect Bush asked John Sunnunu to be his chief of staff 9 days after the election. Bush had wanted a strong chief of staff, but there was tension among his close associates immediately after the election about who should fill the position. According to media reports, both Fuller and Teeter were opposed to Sunnunu’s selection and chose to not join the new Administration. Instead, they both left after the transition.

In the end, according to historian John Burke, “The president-elect had assembled a cabinet and staff populated with longtime friends, most with a high degree of prior governmental experience.”

*** This story was abstracted from John P. Burke’s book, “Presidential Transitions: From Politics to Practice.” If you were involved in this transition, please feel free to add your stories, as well! ***